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1371 
BOUMEDIENE VS. VERDUGO-URQUIDEZ:  
THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OVER 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY AT THE 
SOUTHWESTERN BORDER 
INTRODUCTION 
On the night of October 12, 2010, as he was walking home in Nogales, 
Mexico,
1
 sixteen-year-old Jose Antonio Elena Rodriguez was tragically 
killed by a Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP”) agent standing on the US 
side of the United States-Mexico border fence.
2
 Rodriguez was found 
unarmed on Mexican soil lying in a pool of his own blood, and a later 
autopsy indicated he was shot through the steel fence at least ten times 
from behind.
3
 The CBP agents present at the scene allege that on the night 
Rodriguez was killed, they witnessed smugglers drop drugs on the US side 
of the border and then return to Mexico.
4
 According to the agents, 
individuals on the Mexican side of the border began assaulting the agents 
with rocks.
5
 The agents verbally commanded the individuals to stop, but 
these warnings were ignored.
6
 One agent then opened fire and hit one of 
the subjects, allegedly Rodriguez.
7
 
Unfortunately, this violent interaction across the United States-Mexico 
border is not an isolated incident.
8
 Incidents involving use of excessive 
 
 
 1. Nogales is a city located in the northern part of Sonora, the Mexican state directly south of 
the United States-Mexico border fence near Arizona. 
 2. Rodriguez v. Swartz, 111 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1028–30 (D. Ariz. 2015); First Amended 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 1, Rodriguez, 111 F. Supp. 3d 1025 (No. 4:14-CV-02251-
TUC-RCC). 
 3. Rodriguez, 111 F. Supp. 3d at 1028–30.  
 4. Catherine E. Shoichet, Mother, ACLU Sue Border Patrol over Son’s ‘Brazen and Lawless’ 
Shooting, CNN (July 30, 2014, 8:24 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/29/justice/border-patrol-
shooting-aclu-lawsuit, archived at perma.cc/92PC-LCJS. 
 5. Shoichet, supra note 4. Due to an extensive history of assaults against CBP agents at the 
Southwestern Border, agents face serious risk of physical injury from both lethal and non-lethal 
weapons, including rocks. See Anthony Kimery, Potentially Lethal Attacks Pose Risks to CBP 
Personnel on SW Border, HOMELAND SEC. TODAY (Mar. 29, 2013), http://www.hstoday.us/columns/ 
the-kimery-report/blog/potentially-lethal-attacks-pose-risks-to-cbp-personnel-on-sw-border/89556542 
e96b9df578bc8d1786537fb5.html, archived at perma.cc/AP5S-5FEK (detailing violent attacks on 
CBP officers in the last decade). 
 6. Shoichet, supra note 4. Plaintiffs allege that Rodriguez was simply a bystander at the scene; 
neither he nor anyone near him was throwing rocks, using a weapon, or threatening the agents in any 
way. First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 2, at 3; Rodriguez, 111 F. Supp. 
3d 1025. 
 7. Shoichet, supra note 4.  
 8. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS ON THE UNITED STATES-
MEXICO BORDER 1 (Oct. 25, 2012), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/121024_aclu_ 
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force by US government actors at the border have increased dramatically 
since 2001.
9
 Recently, the surge of child immigrants
10
 has refocused the 
spotlight on the systematic abusive policies of CBP agents towards foreign 
nationals at the United States-Mexico border.
11
 Though the CBP plays a 
 
 
written_statement_ochcr_side_event_10_25_12_final_0.pdf (“[A]t least 18 individuals have died since 
January 2010 as the result of alleged excessive use of force by U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) officials, including six who were under the age of 21 and five who were U.S. citizens. At least 
two other individuals survived serious injuries inflicted by CBP officers in the same timeframe.”). A 
few examples include Guillermo Arévalo Pedroza (killed Sept. 3, 2012, when he was shot by a US 
Border Patrol Agent on a boat while picnicking with his wife and young daughters near the Texas side 
of the border), Juan Pablo Pérez Santillán (killed July 7, 2012, near Texas), Carlos Lamadrid (US 
citizen shot four times in the back and killed March 21, 2011, while allegedly fleeing from Arizona to 
Mexico), and Anastasio Hernández Rojas (killed May 28, 2010, when he was beaten and 
electroshocked to death near San Diego). Id. at 4. Yet there are many more similar incidents. See id. at 
9 n.13. Most recently, litigation over cross-border killings of Mexican nationals by CBP agents has 
stirred controversy, sparked by the death of fifteen-year-old Sergio Adrián Hernández Guereca, who 
was killed on June 7, 2010, near El Paso, Texas, when he was shot in the face by a CBP agent. See id. 
at 5. 
 9. See, e.g., Bob Ortega & Rob O’Dell, Force at the Border: Tucson Sector, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, 
Dec. 16, 2013, available at http://www.azcentral.com/news/immigration/border/tucson.html (noting 
487 incidents of use of force reported between 2010 and 2012 in the Arizona sector alone). The US 
government formed the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) as a response to the tragic events 
of 9/11. DHS is tasked with protecting the United States from terrorist attacks and vigilantly guarding 
and securing our borders through the CBP. ACLU, supra note 8, at 2. Since then, the federal 
government has channeled resources to increasingly militarize law enforcement in an effort to tighten 
and strengthen security measures at the United States-Mexico border. Id. Between 2000 and 2011, the 
number of US government agents at the border more than doubled. Currently, the United States 
employs over 21,000 Border Patrol Agents, over 18,000 of them patrolling the Southwestern border. 
Id. Additionally, new infrastructure in the form of a 652-mile-long border fence and cutting edge 
technology, including mobile surveillance systems, ground sensors, and unmanned drones, are utilized 
as heightened vigilance tools alongside the increasing number of personnel patrolling the border. Id. 
These measures have dramatically contributed to increased incidents of use of force at the United 
States-Mexico border. MARIA JIMENEZ, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF SAN DIEGO & IMPERIAL 
CNTYS., HUMANITARIAN CRISIS: MIGRANT DEATHS AT THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER 8 (2009), available 
at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/immigrants/humanitariancrisisreport.pdf (reporting that between 
3861 and 5607 deaths have occurred as a result of the intensified border security practices in the past 
fifteen years). 
 10. Presidential Memorandum, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Response to the 
Influx of Unaccompanied Alien Children Across the Southwest Border (June 2, 2014), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/02/presidential-memorandum-response-influx-un 
accompanied-alien-children-acr, archived at http://perma.cc/HDE2-R4AZ (declaring the influx of 
child immigrants at the United States-Mexico border to be an “urgent humanitarian situation” 
necessitating an immediate response). 
 11. More than 68,000 children, most of them unaccompanied, have been caught crossing the 
United States-Mexico border since October 2013. Haeyoun Park, Q. and A.: Children at the Border, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/07/15/us/questions-about-the-
border-kids.html. The recent influx of Central American child immigrants is largely motivated by 
poverty and violence in their home countries. Id. On the US side, drug smuggling and human 
trafficking are among the main concerns motivating strict patrolling of the border. See MIGUEL 
ANTONIO LEVARIO, MILITARIZING THE BORDER: WHEN MEXICANS BECAME THE ENEMY 121 (2012). 
Unfortunately, the surge of immigrants, coupled with increasingly strict border patrol policies, has led 
to a spike in excessive force incidents, most of which go unpunished. DANIEL E. MARTÍNEZ ET AL., 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss5/9
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crucial role in securing our borders, it should not do so at the expense of 
human rights.
12
 
The Rodriguez lawsuit comes on the heels of Hernandez v. United 
States,
13
 a landmark Fifth Circuit decision that originally extended 
constitutional protections under the Fifth Amendment to foreign nationals 
injured abroad by the conduct of CBP agents yet refused to recognize such 
rights under the Fourth Amendment.
14
 However, en banc, the Fifth Circuit 
reversed in part and affirmed in part, declining to recognize any 
constitutional protections to foreign victims and granting immunity to 
government agents.
15
 The Circuit’s faulty application of Supreme Court 
precedent under the extraterritoriality doctrine
16
 and strict interpretation of 
constitutional language sets a dangerous standard that encourages abuse of 
law enforcement power at the border at the expense of innocent human 
lives.
17
 
This Note aims to track the Hernandez
18
 reasoning, situate it within the 
historical development of the extraterritoriality doctrine, and evaluate its 
scope and implications. Part I provides a detailed overview of the 
development of the extraterritoriality doctrine of the US Constitution. It 
also describes the modern precedent governing this area of law. Part II 
critically examines the Hernandez decision in light of its theoretical 
approach to extending constitutional protections abroad. Part III evaluates 
 
 
AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, NO ACTION TAKEN: LACK OF CBP ACCOUNTABILITY IN RESPONDING TO 
COMPLAINTS OF ABUSE 3 (2014), available at http://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/ 
default/files/No%20Action%20Taken_Final.pdf.  
 12. US action to tighten security at the Southwest border began in the 1990s, with the adoption of 
several operations that sought to prevent illegal immigration through deterrence. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES 
UNION, supra note 8, at 2. The guiding principle behind “prevention through deterrence” is the idea 
that making the illegal border-crossing journey extremely difficult and dangerous would discourage 
aliens from attempting it. Id. Originally, the United States sought to deter smugglers of illegal drugs 
(players in the drug cartel) and human traffickers (and victims of human trafficking). LEVARIO, supra 
note 11, at 121. However, after 9/11, US border security policy shifted from focusing on curbing 
illegal drug and human trafficking to preventing terrorism. Given the initial underlying purpose of 
“prevention and deterrence,” it may be an inappropriate strategy to patrol US borders effectively post-
9/11. JIMENEZ, supra note 9, at 7. 
 13. 757 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 14. Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 272. 
 15. Hernandez v. United States, 785 F.3d 117, 119 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
 16. In this Note, “extraterritoriality” is defined as the application of constitutional protections to 
individuals located in a geographic area beyond the de jure, or physical, border of the United States. 
 17. See, e.g., Brief for Amicus Curiae Dean Erwin Chemerinsky in Support of the Petitioners at 
4, Hernandez v. Mesa, No. 15-118 (Nov. 30, 2015) [hereinafter Chemerinsky Amicus Brief] 
(describing the Fifth Circuit decision as endorsing “a free-fire zone where children at play steps away 
from the United States have lesser protection than aliens imprisoned as our country’s most dangerous 
enemies”). 
 18. “Hernandez” collectively refers to the panel decision and the en banc decision. Parts II and 
III will make a clear distinction where the two decisions diverge. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the implications and limitations of Hernandez and proposes a more 
accurate interpretation of the extraterritoriality doctrine as a guide for 
resolving this and future incidents of violence by CBP agents. Ultimately, 
this Note argues that the court’s narrow interpretation of constitutional 
language and inadequate application of extraterritorial principles when 
deciding whether to deny or extend rights to foreign nationals injured 
abroad at the hands of government actors is dangerous. Such interpretation 
encourages inconsistencies and perpetuates a system of lawless law 
enforcement at the border, where CBP agents have plenary power to act 
with little oversight and accountability by US magistrates. Instead, this 
Note proposes an alternative framework for analyzing future 
extraterritorial incidents of violence at the United States-Mexico border. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXTRATERRITORIAL CONSTITUTION 
During much of the United States’ history, there was little need to 
examine the Constitution’s geographic reach.19 During the nineteenth 
century, the United States looked to expand its boundaries by admitting 
new states into the Union.
20
 As the United States seized territory and 
began to build an overseas empire after the Spanish-American War,
21
 the 
question of whether the Constitution follows the flag began to seep into 
domestic courts.
22
 In a series of cases known collectively as the Insular 
Cases,
23
 the Supreme Court addressed issues of when constitutional 
protections apply abroad.
24
 Such examination of the limitations of the 
 
 
 19. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 755 (2008). 
 20. Christina Duffy Burnett, Untied States: American Expansion and Territorial Deannexation, 
72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 799 (2005). 
 21. Through the Treaty of Paris, ratified in 1899, the United States seized and acquired 
sovereignty over the islands of the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam. Id. at 805–06. As a 
consequence of its loss, Spain also relinquished claims to sovereignty over Cuba. Id. Though the 
United States declared it had no intention to assert sovereignty over the island, the United States 
obtained temporary control over Cuba. Id. 
 22. Id. at 805. 
 23. The Insular Cases generally refer to a series of opinions brought down between 1901 and 
1922. See id. at 809–10 (compiling a comprehensive list of opinions considered part of the Insular 
Cases). 
 24. The Insular Cases are most famous for their articulation of the territorial incorporation 
doctrine. Id. at 807; see also infra note 26. Though this doctrine was conceived in order to address 
issues of constitutionality in formally annexed territories, these cases are continually cited as good law 
and are applied in contexts where the United States lacks formal control but nevertheless exercises 
sovereignty. Burnett, supra note 20, at 813. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss5/9
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Constitution ultimately developed into the extraterritoriality doctrine.
25
 
Today, the extraterritoriality doctrine defines the contours of the force and 
effect of the Constitution abroad—particularly the applicability of 
constitutional rights beyond the physical, or de jure, borders of the United 
States.
26
 
A. Extraterritoriality’s Humble Beginnings: The Slow Progression from 
Formalism to Functionalism 
The Supreme Court first clearly addressed issues of extraterritoriality 
in In re Ross.
27
 There, the Court denied habeas corpus rights to a US 
citizen sentenced to death by the American consular tribunal in Japan 
following his conviction for a murder committed aboard a private 
American ship in the harbor of Yokohama.
28
 Drawing a hard line at the 
border, the Court invoked a strictly formalistic approach and held that 
American citizens do not enjoy the same rights abroad as they do at home 
because “[t]he Constitution can have no operation in another country.”29 
Despite the seemingly definitive rule that the US Constitution was null 
abroad, the Court briefly reasoned that enforcing constitutional rights 
abroad would also “be impracticable from the impossibility of obtaining a 
competent grand or petit jury.”30 
Next, in a series of opinions known as the Insular Cases,
31
 the Court 
addressed the question of extraterritoriality in the context of its 
applicability to any territory that is not a State; specifically, the insular 
geographic areas of Puerto Rico,
32
 Guam, Hawaii,
33
 American Samoa, and 
 
 
 25. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 759 (2008); see also Burnett, supra note 20, at 797–98 
(“[T]he Insular Cases remain good law . . . doing service in recent cases dealing with the 
extraterritorial applicability of the Constitution.”). 
 26. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 755–56. 
 27. 140 U.S. 453 (1891). 
 28. Id. at 480. 
 29. Id. at 464. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text. 
 32. See, e.g., Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 305 (1922) (holding that the Sixth Amendment 
did not apply in Puerto Rico because the territory was not incorporated into the United States but 
simply belonged to it); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901) (holding the Uniformity Clause 
of the Constitution inapplicable in Puerto Rico because the territory was unincorporated and therefore 
not a part of the United States). 
 33. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 218 (1903) (finding the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments inapplicable in Hawaii after annexation because rights are simply procedural and not 
fundamental). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the Philippines.
34
 The Court formulated the doctrine of territorial 
incorporation,
35
 standing for the proposition that “the Constitution applies 
in full in incorporated Territories surely destined for statehood but only in 
part in unincorporated Territories.”36 As early as the turn of the twentieth 
century, the Court recognized that even in unincorporated territories, the 
federal government of the United States was bound to extend certain 
guarantees of fundamental rights to foreign nationals residing in those 
territories.
37
 The Court heavily considered the practical difficulties
38
 
inherent in “enforcing all constitutional provisions always and 
everywhere,” but maintained that appropriate constitutional provisions 
should apply where most necessary.
39
 This way, the Court slowly but 
surely moved away from the strict formalistic approach to 
extraterritoriality suggested in Ross, and toward a more functionalist 
approach that takes into account the practical considerations of applying 
constitutional provisions abroad in territories subject to some sort of US 
control.
40
 
 
 
 34. See, e.g., Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 98 (1914) (holding that the Fifth 
Amendment did not apply in the Philippines); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 148 (1904) 
(holding that trial by jury is not a fundamental right and was therefore inapplicable in the Philippines, 
an unincorporated territory). 
 35. The territorial incorporation doctrine divided annexed territories subject to US sovereignty 
into incorporated and unincorporated territories. Incorporated territories consisted of places that were 
intended to form an integral part of the United States, while unincorporated territories were places that 
simply belonged to the United States. Burnett, supra note 20, at 800. 
 36. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 757 (2008) (interpreting the importance of the Insular 
Cases). But see Burnett, supra note 20, at 801–02 (noting that the significance of the Insular Cases is 
the preservation of the option to relinquish control over a territory, rather than to draw a distinction 
between areas where constitutional provisions apply and ones where such provisions are inapplicable). 
 37. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 757 (interpreting importance of the Insular Cases). 
 38. A major and recurring practical difficulty inherent in applying constitutional provisions in 
full to unincorporated territories is imposing American law, thereby displacing the existing legal 
system within the territory altogether. See, e.g., Dorr, 195 U.S. at 148 (stating that the United States 
may impose its system of law only in incorporated territories where “under an acceptable and long-
established code, the preference of the people must be disregarded, their established customs ignored 
and they themselves coerced to accept . . . a system of trial unknown to them and unsuited to their 
needs”). 
 39. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 759 (quoting Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 40. Eva L. Bitran, Note, Boumediene at the Border? The Constitution and Foreign Nationals on 
the U.S.-Mexico Border, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 229, 232 (2014). Some scholars have argued that 
the functional approach is fundamentally flawed and should not be used to resolve issues of 
constitutionality abroad. See, e.g., Christina Duffy Burnett, A Convenient Constitution? 
Extraterritoriality After Boumediene, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 1017–18 (2009). Though the 
functional approach’s main strength is its responsiveness to specific circumstances and case-by-case 
analysis in determining the application of a constitutional provision abroad, such careful attention is 
also its fundamental flaw. This approach confers “considerable discretion on judges . . . [and] made it 
possible for courts to be excessively attentive to considerations of governmental convenience, and 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss5/9
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Roughly half a century later, in Johnson v. Eisentrager,
41
 the Court 
refused to extend constitutional rights under Articles I and III and the Fifth 
Amendment to alien enemy combatants detained by the US Army in a 
prison located in an American occupied part of Germany.
42
 Respondents 
were twenty-one German nationals who petitioned for writs of habeas 
corpus after they were captured, tried, and convicted in China by the US 
military for violations of the laws of war.
43
 In his dissent, Justice Black 
posited that the majority utilized a strict interpretation of extraterritoriality 
principles in its decision to deprive habeas corpus rights to aliens detained 
by US government actors abroad “solely because they were convicted and 
imprisoned overseas.”44 
However, moving away from the formalistic approach applied in Ross 
to deny rights to foreign nationals strictly on the basis of their nationality, 
the Eisentrager Court considered several important factors. First, the 
Court both recognized a “generous and ascending scale of rights” that 
broadens as noncitizens strengthen their ties with the United States and 
identified a universal distinction “between citizens and aliens” as well as 
between “aliens of friendly and of enemy allegiance.”45 Second, the Court 
emphasized that the “prisoners at no relevant time were within any 
territory over which the United States is sovereign” as well as the fact that 
the “scenes of [the prisoners’] offense, their capture, their trial and their 
punishment were all beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any court of the 
United States.”46 Most importantly, the Court considered the practical 
difficulties in extending the privilege of habeas corpus abroad in this 
case.
47
 
 
 
insufficiently attentive to arguably relevant doctrinal developments at home.” Id. at 1018. 
Consequently, limiting an extraterritorial analysis of a constitutional provision to “an evaluation of the 
feasibility of [its] application . . . effectively smuggle[s] a version of strict territoriality—precisely the 
standard [the functional approach] purports to reject—into the jurisprudence through the back door.” 
Id. at 1019. 
 41. 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
 42. Id. at 781. 
 43. Id. at 765. 
 44. Id. at 795 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black, with whom Justice Douglas and Justice 
Burton concurred, warned that “the Court’s opinion inescapably denies courts power to afford the least 
bit of protection for any alien who is subject to our occupation government abroad, even if he is 
neither enemy nor belligerent.” Id. at 796. Further, he states that though not every constitutional 
provision is or should be applicable abroad, this “does not mean that the Constitution is wholly 
inapplicable in foreign territories that we occupy and govern.” Id. at 796–97. 
 45. Id. at 769–70.  
 46. Id. at 778. 
 47. Id. at 778–79. The Court points out that granting the writ in this case would be economically 
impractical because the army would have to transport the prisoners overseas for the hearing. Such a 
burden “would require allocation of shipping space, guarding personnel, billeting and rations . . . . 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Overruling Ross, the Court in Reid v. Covert
48
 explicitly abandoned a 
strictly formalistic approach to extraterritoriality and, for the first time, 
held that the Constitution in its entirety applies to American citizens living 
abroad.
49
 In Reid, wives of military men were denied the constitutional 
right to a jury trial and, instead, were forced to stand trial in a military 
court, for charges of murder committed abroad.
50
 The Court rejected “the 
idea that when the United States acts against citizens abroad it can do so 
free of the Bill of Rights.”51 Further, the Court expressed that “[w]hen the 
Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield 
which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to 
protect his life and liberty should not be stripped away just because he 
happens to be in another land.”52 Importantly, the Court warned that it 
would not tolerate lawless government action by making clear that “[t]he 
concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional protections against 
arbitrary government are inoperative when they become inconvenient or 
when expediency dictates otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine and if 
allowed to flourish would destroy the benefit of a written Constitution and 
undermine the basis of our Government.”53 
In his concurrence, Justice Harlan set the tone for future analysis by 
articulating the underlying scheme of the functional approach. Rejecting 
the adoption of a bright-line rule, Harlan noted that “[t]he proposition is, 
of course, not that the Constitution ‘does not apply’ overseas, but that 
there are provisions in the Constitution which do not necessarily apply in 
all circumstances in every foreign place.”54 Instead, he recognized that the 
extraterritorial application of constitutional rights should depend on 
whether doing so would be “altogether impracticable and anomalous.”55 
 
 
[and] transportation for whatever witnesses the prisoners desired to call as well as transportation for 
those necessary to defend legality of the sentence.” Id. at 779. Granting the writ would also be 
politically undesirable because “[s]uch trials would hamper the war effort and bring aid and comfort to 
the enemy . . . . [and] would diminish the prestige of our commanders, not only with enemies but with 
wavering neutrals.” Id. 
 48. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
 49. Id. at 12–13, 18–19. 
 50. Id. at 3. 
 51. Id. at 5. 
 52. Id. at 6. The Court distinguished this case from the Insular Cases on the basis of practical 
considerations. Id. at 14. The Court dictates that the Insular Cases present a set of practical 
considerations, such as applying Congressional power to “provide rules and regulations to govern 
temporarily territories with wholly dissimilar traditions and institutions” which ultimately weigh 
heavily against the application of Constitutional protections abroad. Id. These considerations were not 
present in this case because governmental power was established through US citizenship. Id. 
 53. Id. at 14. 
 54. Id. at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 55. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss5/9
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Moreover, Harlan suggested that when determining whether a certain 
constitutional guarantee should apply abroad, the Court should consider 
“the particular local setting, the practical necessities, and the possible 
alternatives” which Congress had before it.56 Using this “impractical and 
anomalous” test to examine practical considerations, including the gravity 
of the offense, Harlan concluded that in this case—the commission of a 
capital crime—extending constitutional provisions abroad was 
appropriate.
57
 
B. Modern Supreme Court Precedent: Conflict and the Eventual Adoption 
of the Liberal Functionalist Approach 
The Reid decision, extending constitutional rights to United States 
citizens abroad, left the Court in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez
58
 to 
determine whether constitutional provisions also applied to foreign 
nationals injured abroad. In Verdugo-Urquidez, a plurality held that the 
Fourth Amendment did not protect a Mexican citizen and resident from 
the unreasonable warrantless search and seizure of his property, located in 
Mexico, by US government agents.
59
 Justice Rehnquist, writing for a 
plurality, first distinguished the Fourth Amendment
60
 from other 
Amendments, such as the Fifth
61
 and Sixth
62
 Amendments, on the basis 
 
 
 56. Id. at 75. Importantly, citizenship did not appear to be a decisive factor in Justice Harlan’s 
reasoning. He neither agreed with the idea that the Constitution is wholly inoperative abroad under all 
circumstances nor with the “suggestion that every provision of the Constitution must always be 
deemed automatically applicable to American citizens in every part of the world.” Id. at 74. For him, 
the question was simply: “[T]o what extent do . . . provisions of the Constitution apply outside the 
United States?” Id. The impractical and anomalous test should be applied in the same manner in all 
cases. 
 57. Id. at 75, 77–78. 
 58. 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
 59. Id. at 261. The United States Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) suspected Verdugo-
Urquidez to be among the leaders of a violent Mexican organization responsible for smuggling 
narcotics into the United States. Id. at 262. The US Government obtained a warrant for his arrest and 
eventually arrested him in California through collaboration with the Mexican police force. Id. 
Awaiting trial, DEA agents, with the help of Mexican authorities, searched Verdugo-Urquidez’s 
residence and seized certain documents believed to reflect quantities of marijuana Verdugo-Urquidez 
smuggled into the United States. Id. at 262–63. 
 60. The Fourth Amendment stipulates: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). 
 61. The Fifth Amendment mandates: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, 
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, 
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that the Fourth Amendment’s reach extends only to “the people.”63 He 
subsequently concluded that this term of art “refers to a class of persons 
who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed 
sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that 
community.”64 The plurality then devised a test where “aliens receive 
constitutional protections [only] when they have come within the territory 
of the United States and developed substantial connections with this 
country.”65 In addition to the sufficient connections test, the plurality 
highlighted that extending constitutional protections to aliens abroad in 
this case “would have significant and deleterious consequences for the 
United States in conducting activities beyond its boundaries.”66 In the 
process, Rehnquist reasoned that our increasingly interconnected society 
warranted restricting Fourth Amendment protections to persons with 
sufficient connections to the United States. For example, “[s]ituations 
threatening to important American interests [that] arise halfway around the 
globe . . . [may] require an American response with armed force.”67 In 
these cases, any “restrictions on searches and seizures which occur 
incident to such American action[s] . . . must be imposed by the political 
branches through diplomatic understanding, treaty, or legislation.”68 
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy flatly rejected placing any weight 
on the plurality’s reference to “the people” as restricting the Fourth 
 
 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use 
without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). 
 62. The Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). 
 63. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265. Justice Rehnquist strongly believed that “the purpose of 
the Fourth Amendment was to protect the people of the United States against arbitrary action by their 
own Government . . . [and not] intended to restrain the actions of the Federal Government against 
aliens outside of the United States territory.” Id. at 266. 
 64. Id. at 265. Therefore, Rehnquist concluded that Verdugo-Urquidez “is an alien who has had 
no previous significant voluntary connection with the United States.” Id. at 271. 
 65. Id. at 271. 
 66. Id. at 273. A couple of practical concerns guided the plurality’s decision to deny Verdugo-
Urquidez Fourth Amendment protections. First, the plurality acknowledged that the United States 
“frequently employs Armed Forces outside this country . . . for the protection of American citizens or 
national security.” Id. Thus, applying the “Fourth Amendment to those circumstances could 
significantly disrupt the ability of the political branches to respond to foreign situations involving our 
national interest.” Id. at 273–74. Furthermore, extending these protections abroad could encourage 
“aliens with no attachment to this country . . . [to] bring actions for damages to remedy claimed 
violations of the Fourth Amendment in foreign countries or in international waters.” Id. at 274. 
Second, a US warrant is a “dead letter outside the United States” and has no effect in foreign soil. Id. 
Thus, the Court concluded that extending Fourth Amendment protections abroad in this case would 
push government actors “into a sea of uncertainty as to what might be reasonable in the way of 
searches and seizures conducted abroad.” Id. 
 67. Id. at 275. 
 68. Id. 
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Amendment’s protections to a class of people.69 Instead, he interpreted the 
phrase to “underscore the importance of the right, rather than to restrict the 
category of persons who may assert it.”70 Echoing Justice Harlan in Reid, 
Kennedy explicitly adopted the functionalist “impractical and anomalous” 
approach to applying constitutional protections extraterritorially.
71
 Using 
this test, he concluded that the practical considerations present in this case 
weighed against applying Fourth Amendment protections abroad.
72
  
Most recently, in Boumediene v. Bush,
73
 the Court explicitly applied 
functionalist principles when it held that aliens detained at Guantanamo 
Bay have the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus.
74
 In extending 
constitutional rights to aliens beyond US borders, the Court quickly 
disposed of the idea that the Constitution is uncompromisingly invalid in 
territories not under the de jure sovereignty of the United States.
75
 In 
doing so, the Court flatly rejected the formalistic reading of precedent on 
extraterritoriality
76
 by concluding that “questions of extraterritoriality turn 
 
 
 69. Id. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 70. Id. (“The restrictions that the United States must observe with reference to aliens beyond its 
territory or jurisdiction depend, as a consequence, on general principles of interpretation, not on an 
inquiry as to who formed the Constitution or a construction that some rights are mentioned as being 
those of ‘the people.’”). 
 71. Id. at 277–78. For a description of the impractical and anomalous approach, see supra note 
54 and accompanying text. 
 72. Id. at 278. Here, much like in the Insular Cases, Kennedy believed that the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment would impose unwelcomed US laws upon foreign states. Id. 
Furthermore, Kennedy stated, due to “[t]he absence of local judges or magistrates available to issue 
warrants, the differing and perhaps unascertainable conceptions of reasonableness and privacy that 
prevail abroad, and the need to cooperate with foreign officials . . . the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement should not apply in Mexico as it does in this country.” Id. Varying slightly from Justice 
Harlan in Reid, Kennedy factored in the citizenship status of the respondent in his balancing test. Since 
“[t]he rights of a citizen, as to whom the United States has continuing obligations, are not presented by 
this case,” Kennedy ultimately concluded that Verdugo-Urquidez’s alien status weighed against 
extending him Fourth Amendment protections. Id. 
 73. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 74. Id. at 732, 771. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. 
 75. Id. at 754–55 (noting that previous decisions “undermine the Government’s argument that, at 
least as applied to noncitizens, the Constitution necessarily stops where de jure sovereignty ends”). 
The Court further acknowledged that “it is not altogether uncommon for a territory to be under the de 
jure sovereignty of one nation, while under the plenary control, or practical sovereignty, of another.” 
Id. at 754. 
 76. See id. at 756–64. Most prominently, the Court rejected the formalistic reading of 
Eisentrager, specially noting that “[n]othing in Eisentrager says that de jure sovereignty is or has ever 
been the only relevant consideration in determining the geographic reach of the Constitution.” Id. at 
764. The Court further expressed separation-of-powers concerns inherent in adopting a formal 
sovereignty-based test. Id. at 765 (“The Constitution grants Congress and the President the power to 
acquire, dispose of, and govern territory, not the power to decide when and where its terms apply. . . . 
To hold the political branches have the power to switch the Constitution on or off at will . . . . would 
permit a striking anomaly in our tripartite system of government, leading to a regime in which 
Congress and the President, not this Court, say ‘what the law is.’”).  
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on objective factors and practical concerns, not formalism.”77 
Subsequently, the Court devised a test for the extraterritoriality doctrine, 
ultimately identifying that the three factors relevant in determining the 
Suspension Clause’s78 reach are: 
(1) [T]he citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of 
the process through which that status determination was made; 
(2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention 
took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the 
prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.79 
With these in mind, the Court held that “Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, of the 
Constitution has full effect at Guantanamo Bay.”80 
C. Circuit Courts’ Interpretation of Modern Precedent: Split Ideas and 
Application 
Though the Boumediene Court formally codified the functionalist 
approach for the Constitution’s extraterritorial reach with respect to non-
resident aliens, the opinion left lower courts without clear guidance on 
whether or how to reconcile it with the doctrinal principles and substantial 
connections test outlined in Verdugo-Urquidez.
81
 Most notably, lower 
 
 
 77. Id. at 764. 
 78. The Suspension Clause protects the right of habeas corpus by stating: “The Privilege of the 
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the 
public Safety may require it.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 79. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766. As to the first factor, the Court acknowledged that the 
detainees were aliens. However, unlike in Eisentrager, where it was undisputed that the petitioners 
were enemy combatants, the detainees in this case were denied appropriate procedures to determine 
their status. Id. at 767. As to the second factor, the Court considered the fact that the detainees were 
apprehended abroad, but ultimately concluded that extending constitutional protections to the territory 
is consistent with both Eisentrager and the Insular Cases because US control in Guantanamo Bay is 
not transient. Id. at 768–69. Rather, in this case, the detainees were “held in a territory that, while 
technically not part of the United States, is under the complete and total control of our Government.” 
Id. at 771. As to the third factor, the Court expressed that none of the practical considerations present 
in Eisentrager were present in this case—there was no threat of judicial interference with military 
efforts to contain enemy fighters and there was no risk that that adjudication in this case would cause 
friction with the Cuban government. Id. at 769–70. 
 80. Id. at 771. 
 81. See Bitran, supra note 40, at 238 (noting that some lower courts apply Boumediene narrowly, 
limiting its reach to the Suspension Clause and Guantanamo Bay; some strictly apply Verdugo-
Urquidez’s substantial connections test; and some apply Boumediene’s functional approach in concert 
with Verdugo-Urquidez); see also Hernandez v. United States, 785 F.3d 117, 121 (5th Cir. 2015) (en 
banc) (Jones, J., concurring) (assuming Boumediene Court explicitly confined its holding only to the 
extraterritorial reach of the Suspension Clause); Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1, 33 (D.C. Cir. 
2014) (en banc) (Henderson, J., concurring) (insisting the Supreme Court in Boumediene “limits its 
holding to the Suspension Clause”); Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 772 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (interpreting 
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courts have attempted to synthesize Boumediene and Verdugo-Urquidez 
and apply the opinions in tandem. 
For example, in Ibrahim v. Department of Homeland Security,
82
 the 
Ninth Circuit applied both Boumediene and Verdugo-Urquidez to hold that 
a Malaysian student completing her Ph.D. in the United States had 
standing to bring claims of First and Fifth Amendment violations that took 
place while she was traveling to Malaysia to present her research at a 
conference sponsored by her university.
83
 First, the court cited Verdugo- 
Urquidez’s sufficient connections test and factually distinguished this case 
from Verdugo-Urquidez.
84
 Next, the court cited Boumediene’s 
functionalist approach but failed to apply it.
85
 Instead, the court simply 
drew factual similarities between Ibrahim and the plaintiffs in 
Boumediene
86
 and likened the government’s proposed test in this case with 
the “bright-line ‘formal sovereignty-based test’” the government in 
Boumediene proposed.
87
 While the court declared that it was bound by 
both “the ‘functional approach’ of Boumediene and the ‘significant 
voluntary connection’ test of Verdugo-Urquidez,” it ultimately relied 
solely on Verdugo-Urquidez.
88
 Although reconciling the two opinions is 
possible, as proposed in Part III.C, the court in Ibrahim failed to accurately 
apply the more specific test of Verdugo-Urquidez in the context of the 
 
 
Boumediene narrowly limiting its reach to Guantanamo Bay); Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 93–
97 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (interpreting Boumediene narrowly, limiting its reach to Guantanamo Bay, but 
recognizing that Boumediene was not restricted to the Suspension Clause and instead applied more 
broadly to constitutional restrictions on government action exercised extraterritorially); Rasul v. 
Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (interpreting Boumediene narrowly, limiting its reach to the 
Suspension Clause). For an explanation of the sufficient connections test, see supra notes 64–65 and 
accompanying text. 
 82. 669 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 83. Id. at 994–97. Ibrahim was legally in the United States completing her Ph.D. at Stanford 
University. She alleges that she had been mistakenly placed on the government’s “No-Fly List.” Id. at 
986. Ibrahim was initially detained at the San Francisco airport but was allowed to fly to Malaysia the 
next day. Id. However, she was prevented from returning to the United States. Id. 
 84. Id. at 995–96. The court concluded that, unlike in Verdugo-Urquidez, Ibrahim had 
voluntarily established, and wished to maintain, connection with the United States. Id. at 996. 
Ibrahim’s brief departure abroad to attend an academic conference to present her research performed in 
connection with her studies at Stanford did not sever her established connections with the United 
States. Id. Rather, Ibraham undertook the trip with the intent to further develop her connections with 
the United States. Id. 
 85. Id. at 996–97. 
 86. Id. at 997 (“Ibrahim shares an important similarity with the plaintiffs in Boumediene. The 
Boumediene plaintiffs and Ibrahim both sought (or seek) the right to assert constitutional claims in a 
civilian court in order to correct what they contend are mistakes.”). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. (“Under Boumediene and Verdugo-Urquidez, we hold that Ibrahim has ‘significant 
voluntary connection’ with the United States.”). 
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broader principles of Boumediene. Similarly, the Hernandez decision 
neglected to do so successfully. 
II. THE HERNANDEZ DECISION 
A. The Appellate Panel Decision 
On June 30, 2014, in Hernandez v. United States,
89
 a Fifth Circuit 
panel held for the first time that a foreign national may invoke 
constitutional protection under the Fifth Amendment for an injury that 
occurred at the hands of US government agents outside the de jure 
sovereign territory of the United States.
90
 On June 7, 2010, Sergio Adrian 
Hernandez Guereca, a fifteen-year-old Mexican national, was fatally shot 
in the face by a CBP agent.
91
 At the time of his death, Sergio was playing 
a game with his friends that involved running up the cement culvert 
separating the United States and Mexico, touching the barbed-wire fence, 
and retreating down the incline.
92
 CBP agent Mesa, standing on US soil, 
fired at least two shots at Hernandez, striking him once in the face and 
killing him.
93
 
Hernandez’s parents brought suit, asserting multiple claims against 
several parties, including the United States, Agent Mesa, and unknown 
federal employees.
94
 Relevant here, his parents sought to hold Agent Mesa 
liable under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics
95
 for his use of deadly force, a violation of Hernandez’s Fourth 
 
 
 89. 757 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 90. Id. at 272. 
 91. Id. at 255. 
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. Agent Mesa arrived at the scene as the boys were playing. He detained one of 
Hernandez’s friends, causing Hernandez to retreat and observe from beneath the pillars of a nearby 
bridge. Further, despite Hernandez’s assertion that the assault arose in the United States because Agent 
Mesa was standing on US soil when he cocked the gun and placed his finger on the trigger, the court 
held that the location where the claim arises is determined by where the injury is suffered. Id. at 258. 
Since it was “undisputed that Hernandez was standing in Mexico when he was shot,” the claim 
therefore arose abroad. Id. 
 94. Id. at 255. Hernandez’s parents brought eleven claims, including the Bivens claim described 
in the text. The first seven alleged tortious conduct under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). The 
next two claims alleged that the United States and the unknown federal employees knowingly adopted 
inappropriate procedures regarding the use of deadly force and failed to adopt appropriate procedures 
regarding the use of reasonable force when effecting arrests, thereby violating Hernandez’s Fourth and 
Fifth Amendment rights. Additionally, Hernandez’s parents invoked jurisdiction under the Alien Tort 
Statute (“ATS”) and alleged that their son “was shot in contravention of international treaties, 
conventions and the Laws of Nations.” Id. 
 95. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Bivens stands for the proposition that there is an implied cause of action 
for money damages against federal agents who violate an individual’s constitutional rights. Id. at 397. 
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and Fifth Amendment rights.
96
 According to Bivens, Agent Mesa would 
not be entitled to qualified immunity if his conduct violated a clearly 
established constitutional right such that it would have been clear to a 
reasonable officer that the conduct was unlawful.
97
 The pertinent issue 
before the court, therefore, was whether the facts Hernandez alleged made 
out a constitutional violation at the time of his injury.
98
 
At the onset of its analysis, the court flatly rejected Agent Mesa’s 
argument that “the Constitution does not guarantee rights to foreign 
nationals injured outside the sovereign territory of the United States” 
because such “uncomplicated presentation of the Constitution’s 
extraterritorial application . . . no longer represents the Supreme Court’s 
view.”99 The court looked to Boumediene where “the Supreme Court 
provided its clearest articulation of the standards governing the application 
of constitutional principles abroad.”100 The court took special notice of 
Boumediene’s interpretation of precedent on the Constitution’s geographic 
scope, in particular noting that, under Boumediene, weighing practical 
considerations is essential in determining whether a constitutional right is 
applicable beyond US borders.
101
 The court found it clear that “de jure 
 
 
A Bivens action essentially operates as the federal equivalent of a § 1983 action, holding individual 
federal agents civilly liable for constitutional violations committed in the course and scope of their 
official duties. See Julie Hunter, Note, Breaking Legal Ground: A Bivens Action for Noncitizens for 
Trans-border Constitutional Torts Against Border Patrol Agents, 15 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 163, 175 
(2013); Steve Helfand, Desensitization to Border Violence & The Bivens Remedy to Effectuate 
Systemic Change, 12 LA RAZA L.J. 87, 108 (2000). 
 96. Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 255. 
 97. Id. at 260.  
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. Agent Mesa’s argument was simple. He asserted that since any constitutional injury 
occurred in Mexico and since the Constitution does not afford rights to foreign nationals injured 
beyond US sovereign territory, Hernandez could not claim a constitutional violation. Id. On the other 
hand, Plaintiffs advanced several arguments, including one disputing that the facts of this case 
necessitated an extraterritoriality analysis. Supplemental En Banc Brief for Appellant at 18, Hernandez 
v. United States, 757 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2014), en banc hearing granted, 771 F.3d 818 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(No. 11-50792), 2014 WL 7036175. Plaintiffs claimed the extraterritoriality doctrine was inapplicable 
since Defendant Mesa’s conduct occurred in the United States and “[e]very case considering whether 
to apply the Constitution ‘extraterritoriality’ has involved U.S. conduct committed either entirely or in 
significant part abroad.” Id. According to this argument, the fact that the injury occurred across the 
border in Mexican territory was irrelevant since extraterritoriality doctrine acts as a check and balance 
on cases involving government action beyond US territorial boundaries. Brief for American Civil 
Liberties Union Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 4–7, Hernandez v. United 
States, 757 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2014) (No. 11-50792), 2014 WL 7036175 [hereinafter ACLU Amicus 
Brief]. 
 100. Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 260. 
 101. Id. at 260–61; see also Hernandez, 785 F.3d 117, 139 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (Prado, J., 
concurring) (emphasizing the importance of analyzing extraterritorial application of constitutional 
provisions in the context of Boumediene). 
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sovereignty is not ‘the only relevant consideration in determining the 
geographic reach of the Constitution.’”102 Rather, the “inquiry involves the 
selective application of constitutional limitations abroad,” which requires 
the balancing of “the potential of such application against countervailing 
government interests.”103 Echoing Harlan’s concurrence in Reid, the court 
then concluded that the question is “not whether a constitutional principle 
can be applied abroad; it is whether it should.”104 
Tracking Boumediene’s analysis, the court dictated that the three 
objective factors specifically relevant to determining the extraterritorial 
reach of the constitution are “(1) the citizenship and status of the claimant, 
(2) the nature of the location where the constitutional violation occurred, 
and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in enforcing the claimed right.”105 
Though it found Boumediene informative, the court additionally insisted 
that an extraterritorial determination, like any other case of constitutional 
interpretation, requires “an analysis of the operation, text, and history of 
the specific constitutional provision involved.”106 Under this framework, 
the court analyzed the Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations. 
1. Fourth Amendment Analysis: The Court’s Departure from 
Boumediene 
Rather than beginning its analysis with Boumediene as it set out to do, 
the court looked to Verdugo-Urquidez to determine the extraterritorial 
reach of the Fourth Amendment.
107
 Although the court noted the 
applicability of the sufficient connections test outlined in Verdugo-
Urquidez, it also noted that Kennedy’s concurrence suggested that the 
impracticable and anomalous test is better suited for extraterritorial 
analysis.
108
 Though it acknowledged inconsistencies in Supreme Court 
precedent and admitted that the “Boumediene Court appears to repudiate 
the formalistic reasoning of Verdugo-Urquidez’s sufficient connections 
test,” the Hernandez court nevertheless felt bound to apply the test and 
 
 
 102. Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 262 (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 764 (2008)). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. (noting that although “[t]hese factors are not exhaustive, as the relevant considerations 
may change with the facts of an individual case, . . . they do provide a baseline for addressing 
questions of extraterritoriality”).  
 106. Id. at 263. The court specifically stated that since not all constitutional provisions will have 
equal application abroad, special attention should be paid to the geographic references contained 
within the provision in question. Id. at 262. 
 107. Id. at 263. 
 108. Id. at 264–65. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss5/9
  
 
 
 
 
2016] BOUMEDIENE VS. VERDUGO-URQUIDEZ 1387 
 
 
 
 
believed it “must do so in light of Boumediene’s general functional 
approach.”109 The court asserted it was not impossible to follow Verdugo-
Urquidez while staying within the bounds of Boumediene, since the 
Verdugo-Urquidez Court did not exclusively rely on the text of the Fourth 
Amendment; rather, “[i]t relied on the history of the Amendment, prior 
precedent, and practical consequences.”110 
Claiming to analyze extraterritoriality through this hybrid approach, the 
court simply reiterated Verdugo-Urquidez and “conclude[d] that 
Hernandez lacked sufficient voluntary connections with the United States 
to invoke the Fourth Amendment.”111 Although Hernandez’s lack of 
territorial presence in the United States was not dispositive, that fact 
coupled with his failure to accept some societal obligations contributed to 
the court’s finding.112 To support the idea that an individual’s sustained 
connection is necessary to invoke constitutional protections, the court 
cited to Boumediene, where it claimed “detainees at Guantanamo Bay 
have been held for the duration of a conflict that . . . [was] already among 
the longest wars in American history.”113 This is inconsistent because the 
court in Boumediene relied on Guantanamo’s connection to the United 
States, rather than the detainees’ connection.114 Here, on the other hand, 
the court did not consider the border region’s connection with the United 
States, but rather looked at the individual’s connection. 
Additionally, the court explained that its reluctance to extend 
Hernandez Fourth Amendment protections relied on a number of practical 
considerations,
115
 most notably, considerations of national interests at 
 
 
 109. Id. at 265–66. Hernandez’s parents relied on Kennedy’s concurrence to counter the 
government’s argument that Hernandez did not satisfy the sufficient connections test. They argued that 
since Kennedy did not place any weight on the text of the Fourth Amendment and its reference to “the 
people,” only a plurality agreed to the sufficient connections test, and therefore it was not binding. Id. 
at 265. Hernandez’s parents further argued that in Boumediene, the sufficient connections test was 
replaced with the practical and functional test Kennedy articulated in his Verdugo-Urquidez 
concurrence. Id. 
 110. Id. at 266 (citations omitted). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. The court’s sole consideration for this conclusion was that the facts only alleged that at 
the time he was injured, “Hernandez played a game that involved touching the border fence and had no 
interest in entering the United States.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 113. Id. (quoting Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 114. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 768–69. 
 115. For example, since the United States’ Southwestern border area is one of the busiest in the 
world, the number of CBP agents has nearly doubled in the last decade. As a result, the court feared 
that extending Fourth Amendment protections to foreign nationals in the border area would open the 
floodgates of litigation. Additionally, the court noted that the advanced technology recently utilized to 
monitor the border comes with a “host of implications for the Fourth Amendment,” and further 
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stake along the border.
116
 Recognizing that the border area between the 
United States and Mexico is among the busiest in the world, the court 
feared that increased security surveillance measures along the 
Southwestern border, including an influx of Border Patrol agents and 
advanced technologies, “might carry with them a host of implications for 
the Fourth Amendment.”117 As such, the court believed that “[a]pplication 
of the Fourth Amendment to [these] circumstances could significantly 
disrupt the ability of the political branches to respond to foreign situations 
involving our national interest and could also plunge Border Patrol agents 
into a sea of uncertainty as to what might be reasonable in the way of 
searches and seizures conducted abroad.”118 
2. Fifth Amendment Analysis: The Court’s Reinstatement of 
Boumediene 
Despite its flawed Fourth Amendment analysis, the Hernandez court 
correctly utilized Boumediene in its analysis of the Fifth Amendment’s 
extraterritorial reach.
119
 Here, the court claimed that Verdugo-Urquidez’s 
sufficient connections test was not binding because, unlike the Fourth 
Amendment’s use of “the people,” the Fifth Amendment text “does not 
limit the category of individuals entitled to protection.”120 Adopting the 
impracticable and anomalous test in this context, the court declared it will 
“enforce the applicable constitutional principle, unless textual, 
precedential, or practical barriers bar judicial redress of constitutional 
violations.”121 Therefore, relying solely on Boumediene’s objective factors 
and practical concerns, the court ultimately concluded that “a noncitizen 
injured outside the United States as a result of arbitrary official conduct by 
a law enforcement officer located in the United States may invoke the 
protections provided by the Fifth Amendment.”122 
 
 
complicating the matter by extending Fourth Amendment rights abroad would interfere with the 
political branch’s ability to respond to foreign situations. Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 266–67. 
 116. See id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 267 (quoting Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 273–74) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original). 
 119. Though claims of excessive force must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment when it 
applies, the court asserts that in cases, such as here, where the amendment is inapplicable, excessive 
force claims can be brought under the Fifth Amendment and analyzed as violations of due process. Id. 
at 267–68. 
 120. Id. at 268. 
 121. Id. at 271. 
 122. Id. at 272. 
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The court considered Hernandez’s citizenship and status and decided 
that although his citizenship as a Mexican national weighs against 
extraterritorial application, his status as a “civilian killed outside an 
occupied zone or theater of war” does not.123 Second, the court examined 
the nature of the site where the violation occurred. It recognized that 
Boumediene emphasizes the level of control the United States exerts over 
a site and concluded that the United States exercises significant control in 
the border area.
124
 Furthermore, the court considered the long history of 
US political involvement in the border area with policies that often extend 
beyond the nation’s territorial borders.125 Thus, the court flatly rejected the 
government’s argument that control over the border area is similar to 
Eisentrager, where control was transient. Instead, it likened US exercise of 
non-temporary control at and across the border area to US control in 
Guantanamo Bay, concluding that CBP agents “are influential repeat 
players in a ‘constant’ border relationship.”126 Though the court refused to 
recognize that the United States has de facto sovereignty or formal control 
over the Mexican side of the border, it found that “the heavy presence and 
regular activity of federal agents across a permanent border . . . weigh in 
favor of recognizing some constitutional reach.”127  
Lastly, when addressing practical concerns, the court noted that those 
concerns presented by the Fourth Amendment, such as national interest in 
self-protection, constant surveillance with advanced technologies, and 
concerns over enforcing varying degrees of reasonableness based on an 
agent’s location, “do not carry the same weight” in the context of the Fifth 
Amendment because different, more egregious standards govern the Fifth 
Amendment.
128
 Interestingly, the court determined that the relevant 
location for a Fifth Amendment analysis is where the alleged perpetrator 
committed the unconstitutional act, rather than the site where the injury 
occured, as it did in its preceding Fourth Amendment analysis.
129
 Through 
 
 
 123. Id. at 268–69. 
 124. Id. at 269. The court took into account the fact that Agent Mesa was standing inside the 
United States, clearly under US control, when he killed Hernandez. When committing such acts, 
“Border Patrol agents exercise hard power across the border at least as far as their U.S.-based use of 
force injures individuals.” Id. 
 125. Id. at 270. 
 126. Id.; see also Bitran, supra note 40, at 245–46 (demonstrating, through the collection of 
historical data, that there has been a consistent US presence along the northern Mexico border region 
since the mid-nineteenth century). 
 127. Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 270. 
 128. Id. at 270–71 (“The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
while, in this context, the Fifth Amendment protects against arbitrary conduct that shocks the 
conscience.”).  
 129. Id. at 271. 
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this lens, the court concluded that “a strict, territorial approach would 
allow agents to move in and out of constitutional strictures, creating zones 
of lawlessness,” ultimately establishing “a perverse rule that would treat 
differently two individuals subject to the same conduct merely because 
one managed to cross into our territory.”130 
B. The En Banc Decision 
After reviewing the case en banc, a unanimous court concluded that 
Hernandez’s claims failed to constitute a Fourth Amendment violation.131 
Though ultimately reaching the same conclusion, rather than affirming the 
three-judge panel’s opinion recognizing Boumediene’s applicability, the en 
banc court quickly disposed of the issue by exclusively invoking the 
Verdugo-Urquidez test. Thus, it held that Hernandez, as a “Mexican 
citizen who had no ‘significant voluntary connection’ to the United States 
and who was on Mexican soil at the time he was shot, cannot assert a 
claim under the Fourth Amendment.”132 
In the remaining portion of its short opinion, the en banc court 
addressed Hernandez’s Fifth Amendment claim, holding that Agent Mesa 
is entitled to qualified immunity because the law regarding Hernandez’s 
Fifth Amendment rights was not clearly established at the time of the 
incident.
133
 To support its position, the court drew upon Boumediene and 
concluded that the decision, as the Agent’s only potential guidance on the 
matter, may be limited in scope and applicable only to foreign detainees’ 
rights under the Suspension Clause.
134
 As a result, “nothing in that opinion 
presages, with the directness that the ‘clearly established’ standard 
 
 
 130. Id. The court reasoned that holding CBP agents accountable for arbitrary conscious-shocking 
acts against foreign nationals outside the border is not imposing a new standard. Rather, it is simply 
extending the preexisting standard to a new, but similar, group of individuals. Id. 
 131. Hernandez v. United States, 785 F.3d 117, 119 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
 132. Id. (citation omitted). In a concurring opinion, Judge Dennis reverts instead to the panel’s 
reasoning for denying Hernandez Fourth Amendment protection. Noting that the “Verdugo-Urquidez 
view cannot be squared with the Court’s later holding in Boumediene v. Bush,” he declined to apply 
the Fourth Amendment in this case “out of concern for pragmatic and political questions rather than on 
a formal classification of the litigants involved.” Id. at 133 (Dennis, J., concurring). 
 133. Id. at 120–21 (majority opinion). Under the Fifth Amendment, Border Patrol agents, as 
government actors, are entitled to qualified immunity unless the court decides a two-prong test is 
satisfied. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). Under this test, (i) the facts alleged must 
constitute a “violation of a constitutional right” and (ii) “the right at issue [must have been] ‘clearly 
established’ at the time of [the] alleged misconduct.” Id. Here, the court only holds that whether or not 
a Fifth Amendment right existed, the law was unclear at the time of the incident, thus absolving Agent 
Mesa of accountability under the qualified immunity defense. Hernandez, 785 F.3d at 121. 
 134. Hernandez, 785 F.3d at 120–21. 
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requires, whether the Court would extend the territorial reach of a different 
constitutional provision—the Fifth Amendment.”135 
In deciding the case on these grounds, the court deliberately failed to 
decide whether Hernandez had a Fifth Amendment right at the time he was 
killed.
136
 In fact, the court specifically noted that it remains divided on the 
issue of Boumediene’s applicability beyond the Suspension Clause.137 This 
issue, which ultimately turns on the recognition that Hernandez, or an 
individual in his position, has Fifth Amendment rights, and whether Agent 
Mesa’s conduct violated that right, was left unresolved.138 
III. A CLOSER LOOK: THE IMPLICATIONS OF HERNANDEZ 
The Hernandez en banc decision muddied the water regarding the 
applicability of the Constitution at the Southwestern border. Specifically, 
it failed to appreciate the importance of Boumediene in the development of 
the doctrine of extraterritoriality—particularly regarding the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendment rights of foreign nationals. Following that opinion, it is 
appropriate to set a clear framework within which to analyze incidents of 
violence in that region. 
The Hernandez panel properly looked to Boumediene for 
extraterritoriality guidance and followed it throughout the Fifth 
Amendment claim analysis, but the en banc court failed to decide the 
issue. As such, when analyzing Fifth Amendment claims of foreign 
nationals injured abroad at the hands of US government agents, the en 
banc opinion should be rejected in favor of the Hernandez panel opinion. 
However, analyzing Fourth Amendment claims in this context requires 
 
 
 135. Id. at 121. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. On one side of the spectrum, though conceding that the Court in Boumediene consulted 
precedent concerned with the territorial reach of the Constitution, Judge Jones maintains that the Court 
ultimately expressly limited Boumediene’s holding to the Suspension Clause. Id. at 127 (Jones, J., 
concurring). On the other hand, Judge Prado, who authored the three-judge panel’s opinion, maintains 
that, although tasked with deciding whether alien enemy combatants detained in Guantanamo Bay 
enjoyed the constitutional privilege of the Suspension Clause, “[i]n Boumediene, the Court provided its 
clearest and most definitive articulation of the principles governing the application of constitutional 
provisions abroad.” Id. at 136 (Prado, J., concurring). 
 138. Concurring justices harshly criticized this tactic, recognizing the issue of excessive force at 
the Southwestern border as far from unique to this case and urging resolution of the issue. See, e.g., id. 
at 121 (Jones, J., concurring) (describing the court’s decision as taking the “path of least resistance” 
which “delays the day of reckoning until another appellate panel revisits non-citizen tort claims for 
excessive force resting on extraterritorial application of the United States Constitution”). But see id. at 
134 (Prado, J., concurring) (noting that though “similar lawsuits have begun percolating in the federal 
courts along the border,” it is ultimately, and necessarily, up to the Supreme Court to decide whether 
Boumediene is applicable at the Southwestern border). 
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further clarification. In analyzing the Fourth Amendment claim, both the 
en banc court and the panel’s opinion failed to follow Boumediene, instead 
strictly applying Verdugo-Urquidez—inadvertently in the case of the latter 
and deliberately in the former. Such selective analysis ultimately leads not 
only to inconsistencies, but to injustices as well. The remainder of this Part 
summarizes the main downfalls of the Hernandez decision and then 
proposes an alternative, more holistic framework to govern Fourth 
Amendment claims that arise extraterritorially. 
First, the sufficient connections test proposed by Verdugo-Urquidez, 
which the Hernandez court relied exclusively upon, is not good law as 
Boumediene essentially overruled it. Even if Boumediene did not overrule 
the sufficient connections test, Verdugo-Urquidez is not binding since it is 
a plurality decision. Second, Verdugo-Urquidez is limited in applicability 
to cases involving the extension of the Warrant Clause of the Fourth 
Amendment and is irrelevant in cases of excessive force. 
Lastly, should Verdugo-Urquidez apply to extraterritorial analysis 
beyond the Warrant Clause, its relevance in light of Boumediene mandates 
adopting a new approach to extraterritorial analysis, which synthesizes the 
two opinions. Indeed, Boumediene added an important nuance to the 
extraterritoriality doctrine when it adopted the functional approach: the 
examination of the nature of the site where the constitutional violation 
took place, with the emphasis on US control of the territory in question. 
The Hernandez court failed to recognize this nuance when it attempted to 
apply Verdugo-Urquidez’s sufficient connections test in light of 
Boumediene. 
In response, this Note proposes a three-step balancing test that 
integrates Verdugo-Urquidez to clarify and streamline extraterritorial 
analysis after Boumediene. First, a court should examine the nature of the 
site where the constitutional violation took place. Second, the citizenship 
and status of the appellant should be considered. The sufficient 
connections test of Verdugo-Urquidez should be applied under this step. 
Third, the court should evaluate the practical obstacles inherent in 
extending the constitutional provision to the territory in question. 
A. Verdugo-Urquidez Is Not Good Law 
The sufficient connections test, articulated by Justice Rehnquist in 
Verdugo-Urquidez, was essentially overruled in Boumediene. Justice 
Kennedy, delivering the opinion of the court in Boumediene, explicitly 
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adopted a functionalist approach to extraterritorial analysis.
139
 This 
approach flatly rejects Verdugo-Urquidez’s formalistic and citizenship-
dependent test.
140
 Boumediene instead held that, though relevant, 
citizenship is not dispositive in determining whether a constitutional 
provision applies beyond US borders.
141
 Instead, it is among several 
factors that a court should consider in extraterritorial analysis.
142
 Thus, this 
simplistic interpretation of Verdugo-Urquidez is inapplicable after 
Boumediene.
143
 Furthermore, it is debatable whether Verdugo-Urquidez’s 
intention was to impose a categorical rule barring non-citizens without 
sufficient connections to the United States.
144
 Though refraining from 
 
 
 139. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 764 (2008). 
 140. Interestingly, Boumediene rarely mentions Verdugo-Urquidez, and it only does so to reject 
the formalistic approach to extraterritorial analysis. See id. at 761 (citing United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring)) (holding that extraterritoriality relies 
“not on the basis of the citizenship of the petitioners, but on practical considerations”). 
 141. Id. at 761–62 (“If citizenship had been the only relevant factor [in extraterritorial analysis], it 
would have been necessary for the Court to overturn Ross . . . .”). 
 142. Id. at 766 (identifying “at least three” factors relevant in extraterritorial analysis). 
 143. Though no opinion expressly addresses the issue, most scholars agree that Verdugo-
Urquidez’s sufficient connections test is inapplicable after Boumediene. See, e.g., Burnett, supra note 
40, at 1018–19 (“[T]he impracticable and anomalous test made its way from Harlan’s opinion in Reid, 
to the territorial cases, to Kennedy’s opinion in Verdugo . . . . Indeed the test has now crossed yet 
another permeable boundary, finding its way into Boumediene, where is was endorsed, and a version 
of it applied with respect to Guantanamo . . . .”); David H. Moore, Do U.S. Courts Discriminate 
Against Treaties?: Equivalence, Duality, and Non-Self-Execution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2228, 2261 
n.173 (2010) (“It appears that, given his pendular position, Justice Kennedy was able to convert the 
functional approach he began to articulate in concurrence in Verdugo-Urquidez into the majority 
position on constitutional extraterritoriality.”); Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution 
After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 259, 272, 285 (2009) (“Boumediene provides a long 
overdue repudiation of Rehnquist’s opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez . . . . [and] makes clear that lacking 
presence or property in the United States does not make a foreign national a constitutional nonperson 
whose interests deserve no consideration.”); Timothy Zick, Territoriality and the First Amendment: 
Free Speech at—and Beyond—Our Borders, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1543, 1614 (2010) 
(“Boumediene rejects the bright-line distinction between citizens and aliens set forth in Justice 
Rehnquist’s opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez.”). But see Jeffrey Kahn, Zoya’s Standing Problem, Or, 
When Should the Constitution Follow the Flag?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 673, 678 n.16 (2010) (“I disagree 
with Professor Neuman that Justice Kennedy’s functionalism will replace the substantial-connections 
test because I do not share his view that Boumediene has provided an unambiguous rejection of the 
substantial-connections test in all of its dangerous permutations.”). Though it is generally accepted in 
academia that the sufficient connections test is no longer operative, it is possible for the government in 
Hernandez to argue that Verdugo-Urquidez nevertheless held that it would be impracticable and 
anomalous to extend Fourth Amendment protections to noncitizens injured abroad who lack sufficient 
connections to the United States. Bitran, supra note 40, at 239 n.84. 
 144. In an Amicus Brief filed for the Hernandez decision, the ACLU argued that even the four 
justices who joined in Verdugo-Urquidez’s plurality opinion “did not view the noncitizen’s lack of 
substantial connections as dispositive, and instead stressed the anomaly of applying the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant clause to searches in foreign countries.” ACLU Amicus Brief, supra note 99, at 
15–16. Instead, the ACLU suggests that Verdugo-Urquidez should be read broadly to emphasize the 
context-specific nature of extraterritorial analysis. Id. at 16. It further posits that a narrow reading of 
Verdugo-Urquidez, that limits extraterritorial analysis to the petitioner’s citizenship and ties to the 
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using the exact phrasing, Verdugo-Urquidez’s plurality stressed the 
anomaly and impracticability of applying the Warrant Clause of the Fourth 
Amendment in Mexico.
145
 
Even if Boumediene did not implicitly overrule the sufficient 
connections test of Verdugo-Urquidez, the language was never binding. 
Only three other justices joined Rehnquist’s Verdugo-Urquidez opinion in 
both reasoning and judgment,
146
 thereby forming a plurality whose opinion 
is simply dicta. Justice Kennedy and Justice Stevens concurred in 
judgment, but their reasoning departed from Rehnquist.
147
 In particular, 
Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion primarily to express his 
rejection of the plurality’s sufficient connections test.148 Instead, Kennedy 
applies the impracticable and anomalous test codified in Boumediene to 
conclude that the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause does not apply in 
Mexico.
149
 The remaining three justices dissented, explicitly rejecting the 
plurality’s emphasis on citizenship and connections to the United States.150 
Given these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the Supreme Court 
 
 
United States, runs against well-established personal jurisdiction case law recognizing that “foreign 
individuals or business entities without a presence in the United States and with few or no connections 
to the country are nonetheless entitled to due process rights when they are sued in U.S. courts.” Id. at 
16–17. 
 145. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273–75 (1990). 
 146. Justices White, O’Connor, and Scalia joined Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in full, and 
though Justice Kennedy agreed with Rehnquist’s ultimate conclusion, he filed a concurring opinion 
offering alternative reasoning. 
 147. Justice Stevens did not comment on whether the sufficient connections test was the correct 
approach but disagreed with the plurality’s conclusion that Verdugo-Urquidez was not “among those 
‘people’ who are entitled to the protection of the Bill of Rights, including the Fourth Amendment.” Id. 
at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring). Rather, he invoked an impracticable and anomalous analysis when 
concurring in judgment. Id. (“I do not believe the Warrant Clause has any application to searches of 
noncitizens’ homes in foreign jurisdictions because American magistrates have no power to authorize 
such searches.”). 
 148. Id. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“I cannot place any weight on the reference to ‘the 
people’ in the Fourth Amendment as a source of restricting its protections. . . . The restrictions that the 
United States must observe with reference to aliens beyond its territory or jurisdiction depend, as a 
consequence, on general principles of interpretation, not on an inquiry as to who formed the 
Constitution or a construction that some rights are mentioned as being those of ‘the people.’”). 
 149. Id. at 278 (“The conditions and considerations of this case would make adherence to the 
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement impracticable and anomalous.”). 
 150. In his dissent, joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Brennan rejects the plurality’s interpretation 
of “the people” as a drafting technique used to restrict rights rather than grant them. He concluded that 
the plurality unjustifiably applied the sufficient connections test to decide that the Fourth Amendment 
is inapplicable abroad. Id. at 287–90 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Though Justice Blackmun does not 
address the sufficient connections test explicitly, he nevertheless invokes a version of the 
impracticable and anomalous test in concluding that “an American magistrate’s lack of power to 
authorize a search abroad renders the Warrant Clause inapplicable to the search of a noncitizen’s 
residence outside this country.” Id. at 297. 
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has not applied Verdugo-Urquidez’s sufficient connections test since,151 
and many lower courts have refused to recognize the sufficient 
connections test as binding.
152
 
B. Verdugo-Urquidez Is Inapplicable in Cases of Excessive Force 
Verdugo-Urquidez is a narrow opinion that only bars Fourth 
Amendment protections to “the search and seizure by United States agents 
of property that is owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign 
country.”153 Thus, it is inapplicable to claims of excessive force analyzed 
under the Fourth Amendment.
154
 Though the plurality relied heavily on the 
 
 
 151. In District of Columbia v. Heller, in the context of a Second Amendment analysis, the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed Verdugo-Urquidez’s definition of “the people” as “a class of persons who 
are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this 
country to be considered part of that community.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 
(2008) (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990)). However, this case did 
not have an extraterritorial aspect, but rather concerned a statute restricting the possession of useable 
handguns for US citizens in their homes in the United States. Id. at 574. 
 152. See, e.g., United States v. Boynes, 149 F.3d 208, 211 n.3 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[T]wo of the six 
justices in the Verdugo–Urquidez majority coalition did not join the other four justices’ reasoning 
completely . . . . As a result, the Supreme Court’s Verdugo–Urquidez decision cannot be interpreted to 
suspend the warrant requirement . . . .”); Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 835 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(emphasis added) (“To a plurality of the Court, the use of the phrase ‘the people’ suggested that the 
Framers of the Constitution intended the amendment to apply only to those persons who were part of 
or substantially connected to the national community.”); Ramos v. United States, Nos. EP-10-CV-108 
& EP-05-CR-856-KC-1, 2012 WL 10921, at *21 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2012) (“A majority of the justices 
voiced disagreement with the analysis of ‘the people’ advanced by Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice 
Kennedy, in his separate concurrence, expressly rejected the idea that the opinion provides any 
authority for restricting the category of persons protected by the Fourth Amendment.”); United States 
v. Guitterez, 983 F. Supp. 905, 915 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (“The fact that a majority of the justices 
disagreed with the analysis advanced by Chief Justice Rehnquist is significant, as the Ninth Circuit 
does not construe Supreme Court plurality decisions as binding precedent.”); United States v. Iribe, 
806 F. Supp. 917, 919 (D. Colo. 1992), rev’d in part on other grounds, 11 F.3d 1553 (10th Cir. 1993) 
(“The broad language of the Chief Justice was not required for the holding and was not joined by the 
majority of the justices.”). But see Hernandez v. United States, 785 F.3d 117, 124–25 (5th Cir. 2015) 
(en banc) (Jones, J., concurring) (arguing that the substance of Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion 
in Verdugo-Urquidez reinforces rather than undermines the plurality’s opinion and thus cannot be said 
to fundamentally depart from the plurality’s opinion); Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 
983, 996 (9th Cir. 2012) (recognizing and applying Verdugo-Urquidez as binding). 
 153. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990). 
 154. In Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court held that claims of excessive deadly force in the 
course of a seizure are properly analyzed under the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment, 
which guarantees the rights of individuals to be secure in their person against unreasonable seizures of 
the person. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989); see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7–
8 (1985) (analyzing excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment when police officers used 
deadly force to apprehend an unarmed suspect). One interpretation of Graham, promoted by Judge 
Jones in her concurring opinion to the Hernandez en banc decision, mandates that all claims of 
excessive force by law enforcement be analyzed only under the Fourth, and not the Fifth, Amendment. 
Hernandez, 785 F.3d at 123 (Jones, J., concurring). Other interpretations suggest that a Fourth 
Amendment analysis is warranted only when the Fourth Amendment covers a claim. Id. at 134 (Prado, 
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petitioner’s ties to the United States, it specifically considered whether 
extending Fourth Amendment rights to foreign nationals injured abroad 
“would have significant and deleterious consequences for the United 
States.”155 The Court was careful to specify that “[u]nder these 
circumstances, the Fourth Amendment has no application.”156  
The practical concerns articulated by the plurality in Verdugo-Urquidez 
are specific to the warrant requirement and are inapplicable to excessive 
deadly force claims against US government agents. For example, the 
plurality expressed concern that requiring US government agents to 
answer to the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement when 
conducting business abroad would “plunge them into a sea of uncertainty 
as to what might be reasonable in the way of searches and seizures 
conducted abroad.”157 The Court consequently concluded that the Fourth 
Amendment was inapplicable because a warrant approved by US 
magistrates would be a “dead letter” beyond US borders.158 Justice 
Kennedy raised the same concern in his concurrence.
159
 In excessive force, 
and particularly deadly force, claims, there is no worry as to what is 
reasonable because it is understood everywhere—whether the victim is 
within US territory or two feet from the border—that use of such force is 
unreasonable.
160
 As a result, there is no concern for potential conflict of 
laws or conflicts with foreign sovereigns.
161
 
 
 
J., concurring). Thus, with questions of extraterritoriality, when the facts of the case do not lend 
themselves to Fourth Amendment analysis under Verdugo-Urquidez, it is appropriate to analyze 
excessive force claims under the Fifth Amendment. Id. 
 155. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 273. 
 156. Id. at 275. 
 157. Id. at 274. 
 158. Id.  
 159. Id. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The absence of local judges or magistrates available to 
issue warrants, the differing and perhaps unascertainable conceptions of reasonableness and privacy 
that prevail abroad, and the need to cooperate with foreign officials all indicate that the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement should not apply in Mexico as it does in this country.”). 
 160. See ACLU Amicus Brief, supra note 99, at 24 (arguing that the physical location of a victim 
does not affect the substantive standards in adjudicating an excessive force claim under Graham); see 
also Lopez v. United States, 17 F.3d 395, 395 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying the Garner standard of deadly 
force to a Mexican citizen shot in Mexico by a CBP officer); Rodriguez v. Swartz, 111 F. Supp. 3d 
1025, 1041 (D. Ariz. 2015) (holding that a trained Border Patrol agent was not entitled to qualified 
immunity in an extraterritorial excessive force claim simply because of “an after-the-fact discovery 
that the individual he shot was not a United States citizen”).  
 161. The ACLU has argued that not extending Fourth Amendment protections in excessive force 
claims would actually engender conflict with foreign sovereigns. ACLU Amicus Brief, supra note 99, 
at 25. They further argue that injuries, including deaths, of Mexican nationals in the United States-
Mexico border region at the hands of US government agents have already created conflict between the 
US and Mexican governments. Id. The ACLU reasons that conflict would be reduced if victims were 
allowed to “seek redress in U.S. courts for harmed suffered at the hands of border authorities.” Id. 
Furthermore, the Mexican government has specifically expressed desire for US courts to hold 
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C. Applying Verdugo-Urquidez in Light of Boumediene 
Although it has been argued that Verdugo-Urquidez is inapplicable 
after Boumediene and may not have been binding law to begin with, the 
Supreme Court has not explicitly overruled Verdugo-Urquidez. As such, it 
is useful to propose a framework providing for the possibility of 
interpreting the two opinions as complementary decisions that can operate 
in concert. In fact, some courts
162
 and many scholars argue that the two 
opinions should be read and applied together in a manner that refines the 
formalistic approach adopted by Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Verdugo-
Urquidez.
163
 However, the Hernandez court misinterpreted the role that 
each opinion plays in the doctrine of extraterritoriality, and thus its attempt 
to apply both opinions simultaneously was ineffective.
164
 Yet, if utilized 
correctly, the Verdugo-Urquidez decision could be reconciled with 
Boumediene in a manner that clarifies the application of the 
extraterritoriality doctrine abroad, particularly in the border region. 
Though Boumediene articulates three factors that are relevant in 
extraterritorial analysis, it is clear that the Court pays particular attention 
to the second factor, which requires an examination of the nature of the 
site where the injury occurred.
165
 Under this factor, the Court looks at the 
nature of the control the United States exerts over the territory in question. 
This suggests that a constitutional provision is applicable if US presence in 
the territory is constant and influential enough to imply that the United 
 
 
government actors accountable for their actions in Mexican territory. See Brief for the Government of 
the United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants at 2-3, Hernandez v. United 
States, No. 12-50217 (5th Cir. July 2, 2012), 2012 WL 30666823. 
 162. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Swartz, 111 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1035–38 (D. Ariz. 2015) (applying 
both Verdugo-Urquidez and Boumediene and extending Fourth Amendment protection to a victim of a 
cross-border shooting with facts almost indistinguishable from Hernandez). 
 163. See, e.g., Neuman, supra note 143, at 261 (“The [Boumediene] Court rejects formalistic 
reliance on single factors, such as nationality or location, as a basis for wholesale denial of rights 
. . . .”); D. Carolina Nuñez, Inside the Border, Outside the Law: Undocumented Immigrants and the 
Fourth Amendment, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 85, 134 (2011) (“Together, Verdugo and Boumediene suggest 
that strict territoriality no longer exclusively describes the Supreme Court’s distribution of important 
constitutional rights.”). 
 164. The Ibrahim court, among others, has likewise misinterpreted the role of the Verdugo-
Urquidez and Boumediene opinions. See Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983, 997 (9th 
Cir. 2012). 
 165. Though the Court goes into roughly equal depths when discussing each factor before holding 
that the Constitution has full effect in Guantanamo Bay, it specifically notes that this case involves a 
territory with which the United States has an ongoing conflict that, “if measured from September 11, 
2001, to the present, is already among the longest wars in American history.” Boumediene v. Bush, 
553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008). In effect, the Court here emphasizes that the United States’ ongoing 
involvement with the territory is a primary reason for concluding a constitutional provision applies 
there. 
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States has control within it.
166
 In Boumediene, the Court emphasized that 
US presence in Guantanamo Bay was “not transient” and held that 
Guantanamo, “while technically not part of the United States, is under the 
complete and total control of [the US] Government.”167 The nature of US 
control over Guantanamo was thus a key piece of the Court’s 
extraterritorial analysis. Essentially, Boumediene stands for the proposition 
that individuals within a particular territory subject to clear and heavy US 
control are part of “the people” the Constitution is meant to protect.168 As 
a result, when determining whether a particular constitutional provision 
applies extraterritorially, a court should begin its analysis by examining 
the nature of the control of the United States over the foreign territory in 
question.
169
 
Once a court evaluates the nature of US control over a territory, it 
should proceed to examine the remaining factors laid out in Boumediene: 
the citizenship and status of the petitioner, and the practical obstacles 
inherent in extending a particular constitutional provision abroad.
170
 When 
 
 
 166. Id. at 768–69 (emphasizing the non-transient nature of the US presence in Guantanamo Bay 
in holding that the territory, “[i]n every practical sense . . . is not abroad . . . [but] within the constant 
jurisdiction of the United States”); see also Bitran, supra note 40, at 247; Chemerinsky Amicus Brief, 
supra note 17, at 14 (“U.S. agents continuously monitor and routinely project force just over the 
border where Hernandez was killed in order to secure the area.”). 
 167. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 768, 771. However, the Boumediene court was careful not to make 
de facto control over a territory dispositive when declaring that the Suspension Clause applied in 
Guantanamo Bay. Bitran, supra note 40, at 247. This leaves the door open to the argument that a 
threshold lower than de facto sovereignty should also weigh in favor of extending a constitutional 
protection in the border region or other such “space where two countries’ fates are so inextricably 
intertwined, and where cross-border cooperation is so crucial.” Id. It is possible to argue that, though 
undeniable, the presence of the US government in the border area between the United States and 
Mexico is different from the US presence in Guantanamo because the United States does not intend to 
govern Mexico permanently. Id. at 248. However, the extensive history of US involvement in the 
border area and the recent increased involvement in the region weigh in favor of recognizing practical 
permanence of US control there. Id.; see also Rodriguez v. Swartz, 111 F. Supp. 3d 1025 (D. Ariz. 
2015) (recognizing US “de facto control and influence over Nogales, Sonora, Mexico”); Chemerinsky 
Amicus Brief, supra note 17, at 14 (“The ‘objective degree of control’ matters more than de jure 
sovereignty when deciding extraterritoriality, and the United States exerts substantial de facto control 
in the place where Hernández was fatally shot.”). 
 168. Though Boumediene does not clearly define the category of individuals outside US territory 
who are entitled to constitutional protections, the decision has been interpreted to suggest that US 
control over the individual within a foreign territory supersedes US de facto sovereignty over the 
territory. See, e.g., Bitran, supra note 40, at 243; Neuman, supra note 143, at 272. Importantly, 
Boumediene only specifically considered individuals within the physical custody of the United States 
to be within its “control.” Thus, it does not explicitly decide whether individuals not in custody, but 
injured in the physical territory of a region subject to US government activity, are considered, for the 
purposes of extraterritorial analysis, under US control. Bitran, supra note 40, at 252. 
 169. See Bitran, supra note 40, at 253 (noting that control is a “better metric for assessing 
entitlement to constitutional protection than territoriality or custody”). 
 170. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766. 
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weighing the citizenship and status of the petitioner, a court may apply the 
sufficient connections test to determine whether or not the petitioner’s ties 
to the United States are strong enough to weigh in favor of extending the 
constitutional provision in question abroad.
171
 Since the impracticable and 
anomalous test “decreases the importance of alien status when deciding 
extraterritorial constitutional issues,” if US control in the territory in 
question is very strong, the citizenship and status of the petitioner should 
carry less weight in the analysis.
172
 Conversely, if US control in the region 
is weak, citizenship and status should weigh more heavily. In these 
instances, Verdugo-Urquidez’s sufficient connections test properly fits 
within the second step of an extraterritorial analysis. Lastly, a court should 
evaluate any practical obstacles inherent in extending the constitutional 
provision to the territory in question, including potential conflicts with 
local laws and customs.  
The Hernandez court failed to follow this suggested approach to 
extraterritorial analysis. Instead, although recognizing that it was “bound 
to apply the sufficient connections requirement of Verdugo-Urquidez . . . 
in light of Boumediene’s general functional approach,” the Hernandez 
court began its analysis by applying Verdugo-Urquidez’s sufficient 
connections test rather than first examining Boumediene’s factors, 
beginning with the nature of the site where the constitutional violation 
took place.
173
 In fact, the Hernandez court ignored this factor completely 
and only emphasized two of Boumediene’s factors: the citizenship and 
status of the petitioner
174
 and the practical obstacles inherent in extending 
 
 
 171. Rodriguez v. Swartz, 111 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1036 (D. Ariz. 2015) (ultimately concluding that 
the plaintiff’s ties and voluntary connections to the United States weighed in favor of extending him 
Fourth Amendment rights). 
 172. Ernesto Hernández-López, Kiyemba, Guantánamo, and Immigration Law: An 
Extraterritorial Constitution in a Plenary Power World, 2 UC IRVINE L. REV. 193, 207 (2012). If US 
control over a territory is persistent and robust, there should also theoretically be less practical 
obstacles weighing against extending the constitutional provision in question. 
 173. Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 266 (5th Cir. 2014). At the onset of its analysis, 
the court applied Verdugo-Urquidez and concluded that “Hernandez lacked sufficient voluntary 
connections with the United States to invoke the Fourth Amendment.” Id. 
 174. The court did not even engage in a discussion relating to Hernandez’s status as Boumediene 
mandates. In Boumediene, the petitioners were allegedly enemy combatants, yet the Court held that 
their status as enemy combatants was improperly determined, and thus this factor did not weigh 
against the extension of the writ of habeas corpus. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 767. Here, there is no 
question that Hernandez’s status is that of a civilian, not an enemy combatant. The court overlooks this 
fact and instead heavily emphasizes Hernandez’s citizenship and his insufficient ties to the United 
States. Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 266–67. If the status of alleged alien enemy combatants in Boumediene 
did not weigh against extending a fundamental right of habeas corpus, surely a status of a friendly 
alien civilian should not weigh against extending the fundamental protections of the Fourth 
Amendment just beyond the border. 
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a particular constitutional provision abroad.
175
 This led the court’s analysis 
down a narrow path, primarily basing its decision on Hernandez’s 
citizenship and applying the very formalistic approach the Boumediene 
court sought to prevent.
176
 If the court had first proceeded to examine the 
nature of the site where the injury occurred—the Southwestern border 
area—rather than the location where the act that resulted in the injury was 
perpetrated, its analysis would have been more thorough, setting precedent 
for extraterritorial analysis while ultimately yielding a more equitable 
result. 
CONCLUSION 
By codifying the functionalist approach to extraterritorial analysis, the 
Boumediene decision set a groundbreaking precedent for constitutional 
rights of foreign nationals brutally injured abroad at the hands of 
government agents, particularly at the Southwestern border. 
Unfortunately, the Hernandez court incorrectly applied, and arguably 
failed to apply altogether, the practical and anomalous test approved by the 
Supreme Court in Boumediene. By relying exclusively on Verdugo-
Urquidez’s citizenship-based sufficient connections test, the court has not 
only effectively ignored Supreme Court precedent, leading to 
inconsistencies in the lower courts, but more importantly unfoundedly 
restricted, rather than expanded, the rights of foreign plaintiffs such as 
Jose Rodriguez to relief under the Constitution. Such application of 
extraterritorial principles perpetuates a system of lawless law enforcement 
at the border at the expense of innocent human lives. This Note urges the 
Supreme Court to grant certiorari in order to adopt a more promising 
method for engaging in extraterritorial analysis that reconciles the 
Verdugo-Urquidez decision with Boumediene. Doing so is a critical step 
towards achieving lasting peace at the border. 
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